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2Nontechnical Summary
In this paper we assess how the U.S. withdrawal and the amendments of the Bonn conference
will change the economic and environmental impacts of the Kyoto Protocol in its original
form. Based on simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of
global trade and energy use, we show that U.S. withdrawal from the Protocol implies a
dramatic reduction in environmental effectiveness. If emission trading among remaining
Annex B countries becomes more or less unrestricted, which seems to be rather likely after
the Bonn outcome, the reduction of global carbon emissions as compared to BAU will fall to
zero. The reason is that supply of surplus emission rights from Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern
Europe is large relative to the demand from OECD countries other than the U.S., driving
down the permit price to zero. If non-U.S. OECD countries would opt for strictly domestic
action in order to prevent hot air, the global emission cutback only amounts to roughly a third
of the value that could be achieved for U.S. compliance while remaining OECD countries
would suffer more or less the same non-negligible adjustment costs. Such a policy appears
rather unacceptable to citizens in non-U.S. OECD countries - not only with regard to overall
cost-effectiveness but also with respect to fairness considerations. Monopolistic permit supply
by Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe may suppress a larger share of hot air and halve
compliance costs of abating OECD countries as compared to strictly domestic action.
However, environmental effectiveness falls too, with a global emission reduction around 1 %
for the revised Kyoto targets. Hopes remain that the U.S. might rejoin the Protocol under the
new conditions of Bonn. Compliance costs to the U.S. economy seem rather moderate, which
could enhance the domestic U.S. political pressure in favor of coordinated international
abatement.
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Abstract
We investigate how the U.S. withdrawal and the amendments of the Bonn climate policy
conference in 2001 will change the economic and environmental impacts of the Kyoto
Protocol in its original form. Based on simulations with a large-scale computable general
equilibrium model, we find that U.S. withdrawal together with the new provisions of Bonn
are likely to reduce environmental effectiveness to zero. U.S. compliance under the new Bonn
amendments would accommodate a substantial cut in global emissions at small compliance
costs for OECD countries rising some hopes that the U.S. might rejoin the Kyoto Protocol
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41. Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol, which was negotiated in 1997, requires industrialized countries to limit
their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). In its original version, the Protocol was supposed
to cut down the GHG emissions of the industrialized countries during the period 2008-2012
by an average of 5.2 % below their 1990 levels. The agreement will not enter into force,
however, until it has been ratified by at least 55 countries, and these ratifying countries must
have contributed at least 55 percent of the industrialized world’s CO2 emissions (the most
important GHG) in 1990.
In March 2001, the U.S., under President Bush, declared its withdrawal from the
Protocol reasoning that the costs to the U.S. economy would be too high and exemption of
developing countries from binding emission targets would not be acceptable.1
The U.S. withdrawal triggered a discussion among the remaining industrialized
countries about whether or not to implement the Protocol in the absence of the U.S. The EU
declared itself leader in a strategy of ratification without the U.S., but - in addition to EU
approval - entering into force of the Protocol requires ratification by Japan, the Former Soviet
Union (Russia and Ukraine) as well as Eastern Europe to get the necessary quorum. Russia,
Ukraine and Eastern Europe were assumed to ratify, since they expect larger revenues from
selling surplus emission rights.2 Japan confirmed its interest to keep alive the treaty bearing
the name of its imperial city. However, it also stressed that the Protocol would make sense
only if the U.S. - as the world’s biggest polluter - would carry out the treaty.
In this context, delegates from 180 countries met in Bonn during July 2001, most of
them determined to rescue the Kyoto global warming treaty from collapsing after a decade of
negotiations. The negotiating parties agreed on a compromise paper which demanded
numerous concessions, especially by the EU. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and
Russia were allowed a substantial credit for carbon dioxide sinks, namely forests and
agricultural soils that store the greenhouse gas. The latter is supposed to considerably water
down the provisions of the Protocol as originally agreed in 1997. Moreover, the restrictive
position held by the EU with respect to the permissible scope of emissions trading between
                                               
1
 In 1997, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which makes "meaningful"
participation of developing countries a conditio sine qua non for ratification. Given that U.S.
ratification requires a 2/3 majority in the Senate, the prospects for ratification have been rather small
over the years, irrespective of the latest move under the Bush administration.
2
 Under the Kyoto Protocol, Eastern Europe, Ukraine and, particularly, Russia received much higher
emission entitlements than they are expected to emit under business-as-usual between 2008-2012 (see
e.g. Paltsev 2000). They will sell their excessive emission rights if industrialized countries can trade
emission rights among each other to minimize overall costs of abatement.
5industrialized countries is no longer held up. The latest version of the Kyoto Protocol does not
foresee any concrete caps on the share of emissions reductions a country can meet through the
purchase of permits from other industrialized countries, nor does it envision a cap on the
amount of permits it can sell.3 In fact, this means that Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe will
be able to sell all their surplus emission permits - usually referred to as hot air - which may
significantly increase the effective emissions under the Kyoto Protocol as compared to strictly
domestic action.4
There is meanwhile an extensive literature providing quantitative evidence on the
economic effects of the Kyoto Protocol (see Weyant 1999 or UNEP 2001 for summary
reports). However, this literature does not incorporate the most recent substantial changes in
international climate politics, i.e. the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the
provisions of the Bonn conference on sink credits.
The objective of this paper is to assess how the U.S. withdrawal and the amendments
of the Bonn conference will change the economic and environmental impacts of the Kyoto
Protocol in its original form. Based on simulations with a large-scale computable general
equilibrium model of global trade and energy use, our key findings can be summarized as
follows:
(i) Non-compliance of the U.S. reduces environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto
Protocol practically to zero if there are no restrictions to emission sales from Russia,
Ukraine and Eastern Europe. In this case, the demand for emission permits of
remaining OECD countries is sufficiently small to drive down the price of permits
almost to zero given the large supply of surplus emission rights from Russia, Ukraine
and Eastern Europe. In short, Kyoto more or less boils down to business-as-usual
without binding emission constraint.
(ii) Restrictions to emissions trading in order to avoid hot air makes global abatement for
non-U.S. OECD countries rather costly. For strictly domestic abatement, the reduction
in global emissions only amounts to a third of the value that would be achieved for
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 It has been agreed that the use of emissions trading "shall be supplemental to domestic action and
domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party .... to meet
its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments ..." (UNFCCC 2001). The undefined
term "significant" gives sufficient leeway for comprehensive trading.
4
 The effects of restrictions on permit imports and exports have been examined more recently in
Bernstein et al. (1999), Bollen et al. (1999), Criqui et al. (1999), Böhringer (2000), and  Ellerman and
Wing (2000).
6U.S. compliance, whereas total costs for abating OECD countries would remain
roughly the same.
(iii) Monopolistic permit supply by Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe may suppress a
larger share of hot air and halve compliance costs of abating OECD countries as
compared to strictly domestic action. However, environmental effectiveness falls too,
leading to a global emission reduction of only 1 % as compared to business-as-usual.
(iv) Under U.S. compliance, adoption of sink credits together with unrestricted emissions
trading, accommodates very small compliance costs for OECD while global emissions
would still fall by roughly 4 %. The consumption loss to U.S. seems small enough -
around 0.25 % of the business-as-usual consumption level - to justify hopes that the
U.S. might rejoin the Kyoto Protocol during the next years.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in key model assumptions (such as fossil
fuel price responsiveness, ease of substitution among traded non-energy goods, or baseline
projections for economic and emission growth) confirm the robustness of the above results.5
Nevertheless, several caveats apply which may be addressed in future research once the
relevant information and data is available: First, our analysis does not cover a further
commitment period after 2012 that might influence behavior in the first commitment (e.g.
through banking of emission permits). Second, we assume for the case of U.S. withdrawal
that the U.S. will not undertake any domestic policies to cut GHG emissions. Third, no other
greenhouse gas besides CO2 is incorporated in our analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief non-
technical summary of the underlying modeling framework. Section 3 entails a description of
the policy scenarios. Section 4 presents the interpretation of simulation results. Section 5
concludes.
2. Analytical Framework and Baseline Calibration
Carbon abatement policies not only cause direct adjustments on fossil fuel markets, but they
produce indirect spillovers to other markets that, in turn, feed back to the economy. General
                                               
5
 For the sake of brevity, we do not present the sensitivity analysis in this paper. The programs and
data to reproduce the results of the core simulations as well as the sensitivity analysis are readily
available from the authors on request.
7equilibrium provides a consistent framework for studying price-dependent interactions
between the energy system and the rest of the economy. The simultaneous explanation of the
origin and the spending of income of the economic agents makes it possible to address both
economy-wide efficiency as well as equity implications of abatement policy interference.
Therefore, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have become a standard tool for the
analysis of the economy-wide impacts of greenhouse gas abatement policies on resource
allocation and the associated implications for incomes of economic agents (Bergmann 1990,
Grubb et al. 1993, Weyant 1999).
For our analysis, we use a static 7-sector, 12-region computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model of the world economy. The choice of sectors captures key dimensions in the
analysis of carbon abatement such as differences in carbon intensities and the scope for
substitutability across energy goods and carbon-intensive non-energy goods. The regional
aggregation covers the Annex-B parties as well as major non-Annex-B regions that are central
to the greenhouse gas issue. Table 1 summarizes the sectors and regions incorporated in our
model. For the sake of brevity, we abstain here from the exposition of the functional forms as
well as central model assumptions which are standard within the CGE analysis of multilateral
carbon abatement policies. A detailed algebraic model description is provided in Appendix A.
Table 1: Overview of sectors and regionsa
Sectors Countries
Energy Annex B
COL Coal USA United States
CRU Crude oil EUR OECD Europe (incl. EFTA)
GAS Natural gas JPN Japan
OIL Refined oil products CAN Canada
ELE Electricity AUN Australia, New Zealand
Non-Energy CEA Central and Eastern Europe
EIS Energy-intensive sectors FSU Former Soviet Union
ROI Rest of industry Non-Annex B
CHN China
IND India
ASI Asia
MPC Mexico and OPEC
ROW Rest of world
a Aggregation based on the GTAP-EG dataset (see Appendix B).
8As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, the model is based on
economic transactions in a particular benchmark year. Benchmark data determine parameters
of the (nested CES) functional forms from a given set of benchmark quantities, prices, and
elasticities (see Table A.1 for a summary of values of key elasticities). As to benchmark
quantities and prices, we employ the GTAP 4 database (McDougall 1997) supplemented by
OECD/IEA energy statistics (IEA 1996) for the year 1995 as described in Rutherford and
Paltsev (2000).
The magnitude and distribution of abatement costs associated with the implementation
of the Kyoto emission constraints crucially depend on the business-as-usual (BAU)
projections for GDP, fuel prices, energy efficiency improvements, etc. (see e.g. Böhringer et
al. (2000)). In our comparative-static framework, we infer the BAU economic structure of the
model’s regions for the year 2010 using most recent projections on the economic development
and future fossil fuel production.6 The forward calibration of the 1995 economies to 2010
incorporates exogenous information by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE 1998) for GDP
growth, energy demand and future energy prices. The fossil fuel production functions are
finally calibrated to be consistent with exogenous estimates for supply elasticities.
3. Policy Scenarios
The set of scenarios reflects alternative options for implementing the Kyoto Protocol along
three important dimensions of climate change policy, which are laid out in the following.
A. Reduction Requirements
The Kyoto Protocol fixes GHG emission limits for industrialized countries as listed in Annex
B of the Protocol. In our simulations we consider two different schemes of emission reduction
targets:
OLD Option OLD considers a reduction target of 5.2 % on average for industrialized
countries which the Kyoto Protocol originally aspired to.
NEW Option NEW accounts for the compromise as agreed on in Bonn where significant
credits for carbon dioxide sinks where allowed. Countries can offset some of the
CO2 stored in their forests and farmlands to meet their emission limits.
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 Simulation results for emission abatement scenarios are then measured with respect to the BAU
situation in 2010 (see section 4).
9Table 2 lists the original reduction targets (OLD) as well as the revised targets (NEW)
for Annex-B countries. The revised targets are based on estimates for sink credits by the
European Commission as listed in Appendix C. In our simulations, we apply the alternative
reduction targets to carbon dioxide only which is the most important GHG among
industrialized countries.
Table 2: Original Kyoto reduction targets (OLD) and Bonn updates with sink credits (NEW)
OLD Commitmentsa
(% of 1990 base year GHG emissions)
NEW Commitmentsb
(% of 1990 base year GHG emissions)
USA 93.0 96.8
EUR 92.2 94.8
JPN 94.0 99.2
CAN 94.0 107.9
AUN 106.8 110.2
CEA 92.9 96.1
FSU 100.0 104.9
a UNFCCC (1997)
b
 Estimates by the EU commission on the basis of UNFCCC (2001)
B. Scope of Emissions Trading
The Bonn compromise does not set clear limits on the magnitude of international emissions
trading that the industrialized countries could engage in to achieve their targets. The scope of
permissible emissions trading has been a major point of disagreement between the U.S. and
the EU. The EU wanted nations to make at least half of their emissions cuts within their own
borders, whereas the U.S. wanted no limit on the purchase of emission rights from other
countries.
In our simulations, we capture extreme points on the extent to which countries can
meet their specific emission reduction commitments by abatement abroad (so-called where-
flexibility). Unrestricted where-flexibility among Annex-B countries should be considered the
relevant policy option emerging from the Bonn compromise:7
NTR Annex-B countries are restricted to domestic action for meeting their emission
reduction commitments.
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 At the end of section 4, we investigate how restrictions of FSU and CEA on the magnitude of their
permit sales will affect results.
10
TRD There is unrestricted emission trading between Annex-B countries, which assures
equalization of marginal abatement costs but also allows countries to sell off
abundant emission rights (hot air) that they would not have required in the NTR
case.
C. Participation of the U.S.
In March 2001, the new U.S. administration under President G. W. Bush declared with
respect to the Kyoto Protocol that "we have no interest in implementing this treaty." Since
then, the EU has tried hard to persuade the U.S. to rejoin the Kyoto Process - so far, however,
without success. Even the Bonn compromise could not appease the U.S., although it resolves
several of the demands the U.S. had raised in the past - particularly concerning sink credits
and international permit trading. It is nonetheless important for the international climate
policy process to investigate how the economic and environmental impacts of the Kyoto
Protocol change depending on the involvement of the U.S. We therefore take into account two
options which deliver a useful angle of comparison:
 USin Option "USin" assumes that the U.S. will keep with its Kyoto commitment.
 USout Option "USout" reflects the current situation of U.S. climate policy in assuming
that the USA will not be part of the Kyoto Protocol.
Table 3 summarizes the set of core scenarios that result from the combination of
policy options as laid out above.
Table 3: Overview of scenarios
Emission Reduction Emissions Trading U.S. Participation
OLD NEW NTR TRD USin USout
USin_NTR_OLD X X X
USout_NTR_OLD X X X
USin_TRD_OLD X X X
USout_TRD_OLD X X X
USin_NTR_NEW X X X
USout_NTR_NEW X X X
USin_TRD_NEW X X X
USout_TRD_NEW X X X
11
4. Simulation Results
The economic and environmental impacts induced by alternative scenarios for the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol are measured with respect to a BAU reference point in
2010 without emission abatement policies. When we report results for the aggregate of Annex
B or Non-Annex B (Label: NONAB) in the Tables below, we assume that the U.S. only forms
part of Annex B or OECD if it sticks to its Kyoto commitments (US_in scenarios), otherwise
the aggregate of Non-Annex B takes the U.S. into account. It should be noted that scenarios
USin_NTR_OLD and USin_TRD_OLD reflect the policy settings that have been studied
extensively in the literature on the economic impacts of the Kyoto Protocol. These
simulations are repeated here to provide a consistent basis of comparison with the new
scenarios capturing the implications of U.S. withdrawal and sink credits. All the results for
USin_NTR_OLD and USin_TRD_OLD are in line with the quantitative estimates reported in
previous studies (see Weyant 1999 and UNEP 2001).
A. Compliance of the U.S. - No Emissions Trading
We start discussion of simulation results for the scenarios USin_NTR_OLD and
USin_NTR_NEW where the U.S. meets its Kyoto targets (in the OLD or NEW version) and
reduction commitments are met exclusively by domestic action of Annex B countries.
Table 4 points out why the U.S. has withdrawn from the Protocol and why JPN, CAN
as well as AUN have pushed hard for the relaxation of their Kyoto targets via the accounting
of sinks and unlimited Annex-B emissions trading.
Emission constraints as originally mandated under the Kyoto Protocol induce non-
negligible adjustment costs to OECD countries. The reason is that emission targets, which are
stated with respect to 1990, translate into much higher effective carbon reduction requirements
with respect to business-as-usual emission levels during the Kyoto budget period between
2008-2012. Without “where”-flexibility, the effective emission constraints require substantial
changes in the production and consumption patterns of OECD countries towards less carbon-
intensity which induces a loss of productivity and real income (consumption).8 Abatement in
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 From a single country perspective, there is a straightforward monotonous correlation between the
level of cutback, the induced marginal abatement cost and the associated infra-marginal welfare costs.
However, as can be seen from Table 4, these relationships do not carry over for the comparison across
countries, since differences in energy prices, energy intensities, substitution elasticities, etc. across
countries also matter.
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OECD countries produces significant spillovers to non-abating regions through induced
changes in international prices, i.e. the terms of trade.9
Table 4:  U.S. compliance and domestic abatement - impacts for OLD and NEW targets
USin_NTR_OLD Usin_NTR_NEW
Consumption
(in % vs. BAU)
MACa
($US/t C)
CO2-Cut
(in % vs BAU)
Leakageb
(in %)
Consumption
(in % vs. BAU)
MACa
($US/t C)
CO2-Cut
(in % vs BAU)
Leakageb
(in %)
USA -0.67 170 28.2 -0.52 143 25.2
EUR -0.44 168 18.2 -0.34 139 15.9
JPN -0.88 394 28.3 -0.63 297 24.4
CAN -1.81 193 28.9 -1.03 108 18.3
AUN -1.05 85 16.8 -0.88 69 14.2
CEA 0.68 0 -4.9 0.57 0 -4.3
FSU -0.66 0 -4.8 -0.60 0 -4.1
CHN -0.09 -1.4 2.5 -0.07 -1.2 2.4
IND 0.24 -1.5 0.6 0.21 -1.3 0.6
MPC -0.73 -3.7 3 -0.62 -3.2 2.9
ASI 0.14 -3.8 2 0.12 -3.2 1.9
ROW -0.07 -4.3 3.1 -0.06 -3.7 3
TOTAL -0.36 9 11.1 -0.28 7.9 10.9
NONAB -0.08 -0.07
ANNEXB -0.46 -0.34
OECD -0.47 -0.34
a MAC: marginal abatement costs
b Ratio of emission change in non-abating region over aggregate emission reduction in abating regions
Most important are changes on international fuel markets for crude oil, gas and coal.
The cutback in global demand for fossil fuels implies a significant drop of their prices
providing economic gains to fossil fuel importers and losses to fossil fuel exporters. These
fossil fuel market effects explain most of the welfare impacts for non-abating countries. The
economic implications of international price changes on non-energy markets are more
complex. Higher energy costs raise the prices of non-energy goods (in particular energy-
intensive goods) produced in abating countries. Countries that import these goods suffer from
higher prices to the extent that they can not substitute away towards cheaper imports of non-
abating countries. The ease of substitution not only determines the implicit burden shifting via
                                               
9
 See Böhringer and Rutherford (2001) for an elaborate discussion of terms-of-trade effects from
carbon abatement.
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non-energy exports from abating countries but also the extent to which non-abating countries
achieve a competitive advantage vis-à-vis abating exporters. The gain in market shares due to
substitution effects may be partially offset by an opposite scale effect: Due to reduced
economic activity and income, import demand by the group of abating countries (here: Annex
B) declines, and this exerts a downward pressure on the export prices of non-abating
countries.
Adoption of the less stringent emission targets as adopted in Bonn reduces welfare
costs of the Annex B group by more than 25 % - the adjustment costs to OECD countries,
however, remain substantial.
With respect to environmental effectiveness, domestic abatement by Annex B
countries implies a global reduction of carbon emission by 9 % (OLD) or 7.9 % (NEW)
compared to BAU. Leakage, which is mainly caused by increased fossil fuel demand of non-
abating countries and shifts in the pattern of energy-intensive trade, amounts to more than
10%.10
B. Withdrawal of the U.S. - No Emissions Trading
Next, we move to the economic and environmental implications of U.S. withdrawal for the
NTR cases, which are reported in Table 5. At the single-region level, the induced consumption
changes as compared to the case of U.S. compliance illustrates the importance of terms-of-
trade effects. EUR and JPN are worse off because international fuel prices under U.S.
withdrawal are not depressed as much and, therefore, terms-of-trade gains for fuel importers
decrease. The latter effect becomes even more obvious for non-abating developing countries
IDI and ASI. Fuel exporters such as CAN, FSU, MPC or ROW, on the other hand, do better.
The key message of Table 5, however, is that U.S. withdrawal dramatically reduces cost-
effectiveness of global emission reduction. Total costs for remaining Annex B countries
slightly increase while global emission reduction drops by a factor of 3 as compared to the
scenario where the U.S. would not drop out.11
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 A leakage rate of 10 % implies that non-abating countries offset a tenth of the carbon reduction
achieved in abating countries.
11
 Non-participation of the U.S. not only implies that the direct U.S. contribution to global emission
reduction drops out, but also counterproductive leakage more than doubles as compared to the USin-
case. The U.S. now becomes the major source of leakage due to increased domestic fossil fuel demand
induced by the drop of fuel consumption prices.
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Table 5: Impacts of U.S. withdrawal for the NTR case (OLD and NEW targets)
Emission Reduction Option: OLD
Consumption (in % vs. BAU) CO2-Cut (in % vs. BAU) Leakagea (in %)
USin_NTR USout_NTR USin_NTR USout_NTR USin_NTR USout_NTR
USA -0.67 0.02 28.2 -2 9.1
EUR -0.44 -0.53 18.2 18.2
JPN -0.88 -0.95 28.3 28.3
CAN -1.81 -1.09 28.9 28.9
AUN -1.05 -0.90 16.8 16.8
CEA 0.68 0.35 -4.9 -3.7
FSU -0.66 -0.50 -4.8 -3.5
CHN -0.09 -0.09 -1.4 -0.9 2.5 3.7
IND 0.24 0.09 -1.5 -0.8 0.6 0.7
MPC -0.73 -0.29 -3.7 -1.9 3 3.5
ASI 0.14 0 -3.8 -2.3 2 2.8
ROW -0.07 -0.08 -4.3 -2.7 3.1 4.5
TOTAL -0.36 -0.25 9 3.1 11.1 24.2
NONAB -0.08 -0.02
ANNEXB -0.46 -0.48
OECD -0.47 -0.50
Emission Reduction Option: NEW
Consumption (in % vs. BAU) CO2-Cut (in % vs. BAU) Leakage1 (in %)
USin_NTR USout_NTR USin_NTR USout_NTR Usin_NTR USout_NTR
USA -0.52 0.02 25.2 -1.6 8.8
EUR -0.34 -0.42 15.9 15.9
JPN -0.63 -0.70 24.4 24.4
CAN -1.03 -0.46 18.3 18.3
AUN -0.88 -0.74 14.2 14.2
CEA 0.57 0.28 -4.3 -3.2
FSU -0.60 -0.45 -4.1 -3
CHN -0.07 -0.07 -1.2 -0.8 2.4 3.6
IND 0.21 0.07 -1.3 -0.7 0.6 0.7
MPC -0.62 -0.23 -3.2 -1.5 2.9 3.4
ASI 0.12 0 -3.2 -1.8 1.9 2.6
ROW -0.06 -0.06 -3.7 -2.3 3 4.5
TOTAL -0.28 -0.19 7.9 2.7 10.9 23.6
NONAB -0.07 -0.02
ANNEXB -0.34 -0.36
OECD -0.34 -0.37
a Ratio of emission change in non-abating region over aggregate emission reduction in abating regions
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In other words: If the welfare costs for non-U.S. Annex B countries under USin_NTR
correspond to their average willingness-to-pay, as would be ideally the case, U.S. withdrawal
from the Kyoto Protocol would require a tripling of this willingness-to-pay.Given empirical
evidence on the low willingness-to-pay for climate change even in industrialized countries
(Böhringer and Vogt 2001), the dilemma from a political economy point of view becomes
obvious. Besides, the USout_NTR-scenarios would also appear rather unfair to voters in
abating non-U.S. OECD countries, since they have to bear substantial welfare costs while the
U.S economy remains basically unaffected.
But not only acceptance in remaining OECD countries seems unrealistic. Independent
of U.S. withdrawal, FSU wouldn't like any scenario without emissions trading because then it
would face overall consumption losses due to negative terms-of-trade effects (in particular
with respect to its gas and oil export revenues). In this context, it should be noted that the U.S.
position has an important impact on the potential bargaining power of the FSU.
If the U.S. forms part of the abatement coalition, the issue of FSU-compliance won't
matter at all for the NTR cases - neither in economic terms nor in environmental terms (FSU
doesn't abate anyway!). However, U.S. withdrawal gives FSU a key leverage to achieve
concessions from the remaining Annex-B countries: Without the U.S., the enactment of the
Kyoto Protocol requires acceptance by FSU, because otherwise ratifying countries would not
contribute at least 55 % of the industrialized world's CO2 emissions in 1990.
Obviously, one key demand on behalf of FSU will be Annex B emissions trading
without constraints from third parties on its permissible level of carbon exports.
C. Withdrawal of the U.S. - Emissions Trading
This leads us to the final set of core scenarios in which we consider the consequences of
permit trading. As an outcome of the Bonn conference there are no (clear) limits on the extent
to which one Annex B country can meet its reduction commitment by purchasing emission
rights from other Annex B countries. Tables 6 and 7 show the implications of unconstrained
Annex B emissions trading, which - after Bonn - appears as a very realistic option.
Full Annex B trading reduces the aggregate Annex B costs of implementing Kyoto
dramatically due to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across regions. All OECD
countries benefit substantially from purchasing cheap emission abatement in CEA and FSU.
However, welfare costs for USA, CAN and AUN are still non-negligible in the scenarios in
which the U.S. sticks to its Kyoto commitment.
16
Table 6: Impacts of U.S. withdrawal for the TRD case and OLD targets
Consumption (in % vs. BAU) Marginal Abatement Costs ($US/t C)
USin_NTR USin_TRD USout_TRD Usin_NTR USin_TRD USout_TRD
USA -0.67 -0.40 0 170 61
EUR -0.44 -0.16 -0.03 168 61 7
JPN -0.88 -0.15 -0.03 394 61 7
CAN -1.81 -0.92 -0.10 193 61 7
AUN -1.05 -0.82 -0.11 85 61 7
CEA 0.68 1.40 0.09 0 61 7
FSU -0.66 7.67 0.81 0 61 7
CHN -0.09 0.03 0
IND 0.24 0.16 0.01
MPC -0.73 -0.45 -0.04
ASI 0.14 0.15 0.01
ROW -0.07 -0.01 0
TOTAL -0.36 -0.06 0
NONAB -0.08 -0.03 0
ANNEXB -0.46 -0.07 0
OECD -0.47 -0.19 -0.02
CO2-Cut (in % vs. BAU) Leakagea (in %)
USin_NTR USin_TRD USout_TRD Usin_NTR USin_TRD USout_TRD
USA 28.2 13.3 -0.2 0.8
EUR 18.2 7.5 1.1
JPN 28.3 7.4 1.2
CAN 28.9 12.4 2.2
AUN 16.8 13.4 2.1
CEA -4.9 17.9 2.8
FSU -4.8 16.7 2.6
CHN -1.4 -1.3 -0.2 2.5 2.2 0.6
IND -1.5 -1.1 -0.1 0.6 0.4 0.1
MPC -3.7 -2.8 -0.3 3 2.3 0.5
ASI -3.8 -2.5 -0.3 2 1.4 0.3
ROW -4.3 -2.7 -0.3 3.1 1.9 0.5
TOTAL 9 5.8 0.5 11.1 8.2 2.8
a Ratio of emission change in non-abating region over aggregate emission reduction in abating regions
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Table 7: Impacts of U.S. withdrawal for the TRD case and NEW targets
Consumption (in % vs. BAU) Marginal Abatement Costs ($US/t C)
USin_NTR USin_TRD USout_TRD USin_NTR USin_TRD USout_TRD
USA -0.52 -0.25 0 143 39
EUR -0.34 -0.09 0 139 39 0
JPN -0.63 -0.08 0 297 39 0
CAN -1.03 -0.47 0 108 39 0
AUN -0.88 -0.55 0 69 39 0
CEA 0.57 0.93 0 0 39 0
FSU -0.60 5.31 0 0 39 0
CHN -0.07 0.02 0
IND 0.21 0.11 0
MPC -0.62 -0.30 0
ASI 0.12 0.10 0
ROW -0.06 -0.01 0
TOTAL -0.28 -0.03 0
NONAB -0.07 -0.02 0
ANNEXB -0.34 -0.03 0
OECD -0.34 -0.11 0
CO2-Cut (in % vs. BAU) Leakagea (in %)
USin_NTR USin_TRD USout_TRD USin_NTR USin_TRD USout_TRD
USA 25.2 9 0 0
EUR 15.9 5 0
JPN 24.4 5 0
CAN 18.3 8.4 0
AUN 14.2 9.2 0
CEA -4.3 12.5 0
FSU -4.1 11.6 0
CHN -1.2 -0.9 0 2.4 1.7 0
IND -1.3 -0.7 0 0.6 0.3 0
MPC -3.2 -1.9 0 2.9 1.7 0
ASI -3.2 -1.7 0 1.9 1 0
ROW -3.7 -1.8 0 3 1.5 0
TOTAL 7.9 3.9 0 10.9 6.3 0
a Ratio of emission change in non-abating region over aggregate emission reduction in abating regions
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Monetary transfers to CEA and FSU are large and provide major welfare gains, in
particular to FSU. As expected, adoption of the less stringent emission reduction targets
(NEW) not only reduces the burden to OECD countries but also the benefits to CEA and FSU
from permit trading: The decline in abatement demand of OECD countries drives down the
price of tradable permits. Trade in emission rights reduces global leakage. However, global
emission reduction under U.S. compliance drops by one third for the original Kyoto targets
(OLD) and by one half for the revised Kyoto targets (NEW) as a consequence of hot air. This
negative impact on global emission reduction should not obscure the fact that global
emissions fall noticeably and average costs per emission reduction for abating OECD
countries are much more favorable as compared to the cases without emission trading
(USin_NTR and, in particular, USout_NTR).
U.S. withdrawal, joint with emissions trading between remaining Annex B countries,
implies negligible costs for meeting the OLD Kyoto targets and zero costs for meeting the
NEW Kyoto targets. Since the U.S. as the world largest potential buyer of emission rights
drops off the permit market, the price of emission permits fall close to zero in the OLD case.
With relaxed Kyoto targets (NEW), the permit price even hits zero, as the demand of
remaining Annex-B countries is small relative to the supply of surplus emission rights from
FSU and CEA. While U.S. withdrawal and unconstrained Annex B emissions trading sounds
like good news from the aggregate cost side, the environmental effectiveness is more or less
zero. To put it differently, Kyoto comes at no costs because the world economy and its
emissions develop as in business-as-usual.
D. Monopolistic Permit Supply
Competitive behavior of FSU and CEA on the permit market may seem somewhat
implausible for the case in which the international permit price falls to zero and emission sales
therefore do not create any revenue. What will happen if these countries behave as
monopolists restricting their supply in order to drive up the international carbon price? As a
shortcut, we mimic such a behavior by imposing caps on emission right exports from FSU
and CEA. Concretely, we assume that export quotas for FSU and CEA will be 0%, 10%,
20%, 30%, ..., 90%, and 100% of the difference between their business-as-usual emissions
and their emission entitlements after the Bonn updates. Table 8 summarizes reports results for
non-compliance of the U.S. and otherwise unrestricted intra-OECD emissions trading.12
                                               
12
 Rents from export quotas accrue to FSU and CEA respectively.
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Table 8: Export quotas on hot air from FSU and CEA
USout_NTR_NEW 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Consumption (in % vs. BAU)
USA 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
EUR -0.42 -0.45 -0.40 -0.35 -0.29 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 0 0
JPN -0.70 -0.42 -0.36 -0.31 -0.25 -0.20 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 0 0
CAN -0.46 -0.48 -0.49 -0.47 -0.43 -0.38 -0.30 -0.22 -0.12 -0.01 0 0
AUN -0.74 -0.72 -0.71 -0.67 -0.60 -0.51 -0.41 -0.29 -0.16 -0.02 0 0
CEA 0.28 0.28 0.40 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.37 0.28 0.16 0.02 0 0
FSU -0.45 -0.40 1.10 2.04 2.52 2.61 2.37 1.85 1.09 0.14 0 0
CHN -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0 0 0 0
IND 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 0
MPC -0.23 -0.22 -0.18 -0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0 0 0
ASI 0 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 0 0
ROW -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0 0 0
TOTAL -0.19 -0.16 -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0 0 0
NONAB -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 0 0 0 0
ANNEXB -0.36 -0.31 -0.24 -0.19 -0.14 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0 0 0
OECD1 -0.37 -0.32 -0.28 -0.25 -0.21 -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 0 0
Marginal Abatement Costs ($US/t C)
EUR 130 141 117 95 75 57 41 26 13 2 0 0
JPN 285 141 117 95 75 57 41 26 13 2 0 0
CAN 83 141 117 95 75 57 41 26 13 2 0 0
AUN 63 141 117 95 75 57 41 26 13 2 0 0
CO2-Cut (in % vs. BAU)
USA -1.6 -1.6 -1.4 -1.2 -1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0 0
EUR 15.9 17 14.8 12.6 10.5 8.4 6.3 4.2 2.2 0.3 0 0
JPN 24.4 15.8 13.9 12 10.1 8.2 6.2 4.3 2.3 0.3 0 0
CAN 18.3 26.4 23.5 20.5 17.4 14.2 10.9 7.5 4 0.5 0 0
AUN 14.2 26 23.2 20.3 17.2 14.1 10.9 7.6 4.1 0.5 0 0
CEA -3.2 -3.3 -2.8 -2.4 -2 -1.6 -1.2 -0.8 -0.4 0 0 0
FSU -3 -3 -2.8 -2.6 -2.3 -1.9 -1.5 -1.1 -0.6 -0.1 0 0
CHN -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0 0
IND -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0 0 0
MPC -1.5 -1.6 -1.3 -1.1 -0.9 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0 0 0
ASI -1.8 -1.9 -1.6 -1.3 -1.1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0 0
ROW -2.3 -2.4 -2 -1.7 -1.4 -1.1 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3 0 0 0
TOTAL 2.7 2.7 2.3 2 1.7 1.3 1 0.7 0.4 0 0 0
Leakageb (in %)
USA 8.8 9 7.8 6.7 5.6 4.5 3.4 2.3 1.2 0.1 0 0
CHN 3.6 3.6 3.1 2.6 2.1 1.7 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.1 0 0
IND 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0
MPC 3.4 3.4 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.4 1 0.7 0.3 0 0 0
ASI 2.6 2.7 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 0 0 0
ROW 4.5 4.6 4 3.4 2.8 2.2 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.1 0 0
TOTAL 23.6 24 20.7 17.5 14.4 11.5 8.6 5.8 3 0.3 0 0
a
 N.B.: OECD does not include the U.S. (non-compliance case)
b Ratio of emission change in non-abating region over aggregate emission reduction in abating regions
20
We have also listed the results for the scenario USout_NTR_NEW to accommodate the
direct comparison with the NTR case. Column "0" of Table 8 captures a situation in which
FSU and CEA will not export any emission rights but intra-OECD emissions trading takes
place. The latter cuts down compliance costs for the OECD aggregate by nearly 15 % without
loss of environmental effectiveness as compared to the no-emission-trading case
(USout_NTR_NEW).
Comparison of regional welfare between USout_NTR_NEW and the Column "0"
indicates that emissions trading does not lead to a Pareto improvement. This is a clear
instance of terms-of-trade effects: Although it is known that - in the absence of second-best
effects - emissions trading must improve global efficiency, there is no guarantee - a priori -
that every region will benefit from emissions trading. The reason behind this ambiguity are
changes in the terms of trade which - contrary to the wide-spread partial equilibrium approach
in environmental policy analysis - are taken into account in our general equilibrium
framework.
When FSU and CEA sell hot air, the international price of carbon permits as well as
total OECD compliance costs fall towards larger amounts of hot air exports. Column "100" of
Table 8, where FSU and CEA sell off total hot air, coincides with the scenario
USout_TRD_NEW in Table 6 with a permit price of zero and no changes as compared to
BAU. Neither of the two extreme cases is attractive for FSU and CEA because they can not
capitalize on sales of emission rights.
The numerical results indicate that FSU would aim at restricting permits sales at 40 %
of hot air in order to maximize welfare.13 In this case, OECD costs and global emission
reduction drop roughly to half the value that arises for exclusive intra-OECD emissions
trading. Table 8 illustrates the potential trade-offs between environmental effectiveness and
total costs of OECD compliance on the one hand, as well as burden sharing between OECD
and FSU/CEA on the other hand.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated different scenarios for implementing the Kyoto Protocol
combining alternative options along three important policy dimensions: U.S. compliance
                                               
13
 Note that CEA prefers a slightly more restrictive export quota regime because the foregone revenues
from permit sales would be more than offset from terms-of-trade gains on fossil fuel markets due to
the larger fall in international fuel prices.
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versus U.S. withdrawal, domestic action versus unrestricted Annex B emissions trading, and
the original Kyoto targets versus the relaxed targets of Bonn.
Our results clearly indicate that U.S. withdrawal from the Protocol implies a dramatic
reduction in environmental effectiveness. If emission trading among remaining Annex-B
countries becomes more or less unrestricted, which seems to be rather likely after the Bonn
outcome, the reduction of global carbon emissions as compared to BAU will fall to zero. The
reason is that supply of surplus emission rights from Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe is
large relative to the demand from OECD countries other than the U.S., driving down the
permit price close to zero (if Kyoto targets had not been relaxed for sink credits) or to zero (if
Kyoto targets are updated with sink credits).
If remaining OECD countries would opt for strictly domestic action in order to prevent
hot air, global carbon emissions could be reduced by 2.7 % (with sink credits) or 3.1 %
(without sink credits). However, the global emission cutback would then only amount to
roughly a third of the value that could be achieved for U.S. compliance while remaining
OECD countries would suffer more or less the same non-negligible adjustment costs. Implicit
willingness-to-pay, thus, would have to triple in these countries. Such a policy appears rather
unacceptable to citizens in non-U.S. OECD countries - not only with regard to overall cost-
effectiveness but also with respect to fairness considerations.
Monopolistic permit supply by Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe may suppress a
larger share of hot air and halve compliance costs of abating OECD countries as compared to
strictly domestic action. However, environmental effectiveness falls too, with a global
emission reduction around 1 % for the revised Kyoto targets.
Policy makers have welcomed the outcome of the Bonn climate negotiations as a
decisive breakthrough in international climate politics. The environmental effects can not be
the reason for celebration: Sink credits, hot air through emissions trading and, in particular,
the continued U.S. withdrawal will make Kyoto ineffective in environmental terms.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that - even without any effective emission cutback - the
ratification of Kyoto is crucial for the further policy process of climate protection. Failure
might have thrown back the efforts to climate protection by several years. Hopes remain that
the U.S. might rejoin the Protocol under the new conditions. Compliance costs to the U.S.
economy seem rather moderate, which could enhance the domestic U.S. political pressure in
favor of coordinated international abatement. Starting from a ratified Kyoto Protocol, it will
be also much easier to achieve effective GHG emission reduction in the second commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol after 2012.
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Appendix A: Detailed Algebraic Model Description
This section outlines the main characteristics of a generic static general equilibrium model of
the world economy designed for the medium-run economic analysis of carbon abatement
constraints. It is a well-known Arrow-Debreu model that concerns the interaction of
consumers and producers in markets. Consumers in the model have a primary exogenous
endowment of the commodities and a set of preferences giving demand functions for each
commodity. The demands depend on all prices; they are continuous and non-negative,
homogenous of degree zero in factor prices and satisfy Walras’ Law, i.e. the total value of
consumer expenditure equals consumer income at any set of prices. Market demands are the
sum of final and intermediate demands. Producers maximize profits given a constant returns
to scale production technology. Because of the homogeneity of degree zero of the demand
functions and the linear homogeneity of the profit functions in prices, only relative prices
matter in such a model. Two classes of conditions characterize the competitive equilibrium in
the model: market clearance conditions and zero profit conditions. In equilibrium, price levels
and production levels in each industry are such that market demand equals market supply for
each commodity. Profit maximization under a constant returns to scale technology implies
that no activity does any better than break even at equilibrium prices. The model is a system
of simultaneous, non-linear equations with the number of equations equal to the number of
variables.
A.1 Production
Within each region (indexed by the subscript r), each producing sector (indexed
interchangeable by i and j) is represented by a single-output producing firm which chooses
input and output quantities in order to maximize profits. Firm behavior can be construed as a
two-stage procedure in which the firm selects the optimal quantities of primary factors k
(indexed by f) and intermediate inputs x from other sectors in order to minimize production
costs given input prices and some production level Y with
Y = ϕ (k,x) the production functions. The second stage, given an exogenous output price, is
the selection of the output level Y to maximize profits. The firm’s problem is then:
( ) ( )
, ,
, , . . ,
jir jir fir
ir ir ir ir jr fr ir ir ir jir fir
y x k
Max p Y C p w Y s t Y x kϕΠ = ⋅ − =
 [1]
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where Π denotes the profit functions, C the cost functions which relate the minimum
possible total costs of producing Y to the positive input prices, technology parameters, and the
output quantity Y, and p and w are the prices for goods and factors, respectively.
Production of each good takes place according to constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production functions, which exhibit constant returns to scale. Therefore, the output
price equals the per-unit cost in each sector, and firms make zero profits in equilibrium
(Euler’s Theorem). Profit maximization under constant returns to scale implies the
equilibrium condition:
( , ) 0ir ir ir jr frp c p wπ = − =     (zero profit condition)           [2]
where c and π are the unit cost and profit functions, respectively.
Demand functions for goods and factors can be derived by Shepard’s Lemma. It
suggests that the first-order differentiation of the cost function with respect to an input price
yields the cost-minimizing demand function for the corresponding input. Hence, the
intermediate demand for good j in sector i is:
ir irjir ir
jr jr
C c
x Y
p p
∂ ∂
= = ⋅
∂ ∂
                                          [3]
and the demand for factor f in sector i is:
ir ir
fir ir
fr fr
C ck Y
w w
∂ ∂
= = ⋅
∂ ∂
                                        [4]
The profit functions posses a corresponding derivative property (Hotelling’s Lemma):
ir irjir ir
jr jr
x Y
p p
π∂Π ∂
= = ⋅
∂ ∂
  and  ir irfir ir
fr fr
k Y
w w
π∂Π ∂
= = ⋅
∂ ∂
         [5]
The variable, price dependent input coefficients, which appear subsequently in the
market clearance conditions, are thus:
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x ir irjir
jr jr
c
a
p p
π∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
  and  k ir irfir
fr fr
c
a
w w
π∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
             [6]
The model captures the production of commodities by aggregate, hierarchical (or
nested) constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions that characterize the
technology through substitution possibilities between capital, labor, energy and material (non-
energy) intermediate inputs (KLEM). Two types of production functions are employed: those
for fossil fuels (in our case v = COL, CRU, GAS) and those for non-fossil fuels (in our case n
= EIS, ELE, OIL, ROI).
Figure A.1 illustrates the nesting structure in non-fossil fuel production. In the
production of non-fossil fuels nr, non-energy intermediate inputs M (used in fixed coefficients
among themselves) are employed in (Leontief) fixed proportions with an aggregate of capital,
labor and energy at the top level. At the second level, a CES function describes the
substitution possibilities between the aggregate energy input E and the value-added aggregate
KL (For the sake of simplicity, the symbols α, β, φ and θ are used throughout the model
description to denote the technology coefficients.):
( ) 1/min 1 ,
KLE
KLE KLE
nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nrY M E KL
ρ
ρ ρθ θ φ α β
   
= − +     
       [7]
with σ KLE = 1/(1-ρ KLE) the elasticity of substitution between energy and the primary
factor aggregate and θ the input (Leontief) coefficient. Finally, at the third level, capital and
labor factor inputs trade-off with a constant elasticity of substitution σ KL:
1/ KLKL KL
nr nr nr nr nr nrKL K L
ρ
ρ ρφ α β = +   .                             [8]
As to the formation of the energy aggregate E, we employ several levels of nesting to
represent differences in substitution possibilities between primary fossil fuel types as well as
substitution between the primary fossil fuel composite and secondary energy, i.e. electricity.
The energy aggregate is a CES composite of electricity and primary energy inputs FF with
elasticity σ E = 1/(1-ρ E) at the top nest:
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1/ EE E
nr nr nr nr nr nrE ELE FF
ρ
ρ ρφ α β = +   .                       [9]
The primary energy composite is defined as a CES function of coal and the composite
of refined oil and natural gas with elasticity σ COA = 1/(1-ρ COA). The oil-gas composite is
assumed to have a simple Cobb-Douglas functional form with value shares given by θ :
( ) 1/1
COA
COA
COA
nr nr
nr nr nr nr nrFF COA OIL GAS
ρ
ρθ θρφ α β − = + ⋅   
 . [10]
Figure A.1: Nesting structure of non-fossil fuel production
Fossil fuel resources v are modeled as graded resources. The structure of production of
fossil fuels is given in Figure A.2. It is characterized by the presence of a fossil fuel resource
in fixed supply. All inputs, except for the sector-specific resource R, are aggregated in fixed
proportions at the lower nest. Mine managers minimize production costs subject to the
technology constraint:
MCRU
Y
σ = 0
σ KLE
OIL GAS
COA
ELE
σ E
σ COA
σ = 1
FF
E
K L
KL
σ KL
28
( )
1/
min , , ,
f
vff v
v K L E M
vr vr vr vr vr vr vr vr vr vr vr vr jvrY R K L E M
ρ
ρρφ α β θ θ θ θ
   = +     
 [11]
The resource grade structure is reflected by the elasticity of substitution between the
fossil fuel resource and the capital-labor-energy-material aggregate in production. The
substitution elasticity between the specific factor and the Leontief composite at the top level is
σvr
f
 = 1/(1-ρvrf). This substitution elasticity is calibrated in consistency with an exogenously
given supply elasticity of fossil fuel εvr according to
1 fvr
vr vr
vr
γ
ε σ
γ
−
=                                             [12]
with γvr the resource value share.
Figure A.2: Nesting structure for fossil fuel production
We now turn to the derivation of the factor demand functions for the nested CES
production functions, taking into account the duality between the production function and the
cost function The total cost function that reflects the same production technology as the CES
production function for e.g. value added KL in non-fossil fuel production given by [8] is:
( )1 11 11 KLKL KL KL KLKL
nr nr nr nr nr nr
nr
C PK PL KL
σ
σ σ σ σα βφ
−
− − 
= + ⋅      [13]
MEL
σ = 0
K
Y
R
σ  f
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where PK and PL are the per-unit factor costs for the industry including factor taxes if
applicable. The price function for the value-added aggregate at the third level is:
( )1 11 11 KLKL KL KL KL KL
nr nr nr nr nr nr
nr
PKL PK PL c
σ
σ σ σ σα βφ
−
− − 
= + =               [14]
Shepard’s Lemma gives the price-dependent composition of the value-added
aggregate as:
   
1
KL
KL
nr nr
nr nr
nr nr
K PKL
KL PK
σ
σφ α−  = ⋅   , 
1
KL
KL
nr nr
nr nr
nr nr
L PKL
KL PL
σ
σφ β−  = ⋅    [15]
In order to determine the variable input coefficient for capital and labor anrK = Knr / Ynr
and anrL = Lnr / Ynr , one has to multiply [15] with the per unit demand for
the value added aggregate KLnr / Ynr, which can be derived in an analogous manner. The cost
function associated with the production function [7] is:
 ( )
$
 
1
11 11
KLE KLE KLEKLE KLE
nr
nrnr nr nr nr nrnr
nr
PY PM PE PKL
σ σ σσ σθθ α βφ
−
− −
 
= − + +  
[16]
and
$ 
1
KLE
KLE
nr nr
nr nr nr
nr nr
KL PY
Y PKL
σ
σθ φ β−  = ⋅                         [17]
with θnr the KLE value share in total production. The variable input coefficient for e.g.
labor is then:
$ 
11
KL KLE
KLEKLL nr nr
nr nr nr nrnr nr
nr nr
PKL PY
a
PL PKL
σ σ
σσθ φ φ β β−−    = ⋅ ⋅           [18]
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A.2 Households
In each region, private demand for goods and services is derived from utility maximization of
a representative household subject to a budget constraint given by the income level INC. The
agent is endowed with the supplies of the primary factors of production (natural resources
used for fossil fuel production, labor and capital) and tax revenues. In our comparative-static
framework, overall investment demand is fixed at the reference level. The household’s
problem is then:
( ) . .
ir
frr ir r fr r ir ird f i
Max W d s t INC w k TR p d= + =∑ ∑           [19]
where W is the welfare of the representative household in region r, d denotes the final
demand for commodities, k  is the aggregate factor endowment of the representative agent and
TR are total tax revenues. Household preferences are characterized by a CES utility function.
As in production, the maximization problem in [1] can thus be expressed in form of an unit
expenditure function e or welfare price index pw, given by:
( )r r irpw e p=                                                  [20]
Compensated final demand functions are derived from Roy’s Identity as:
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                                              [21]
with INC  the initial level of expenditures.
In the model, welfare of the representative agent is represented as a CES composite of
a fossil fuel aggregate and a non-fossil fuel consumption bundle. Substitution patterns within
the latter are reflected via a Cobb-Douglas function. The fossil fuel aggregate in final demand
consists of the various fossil fuels (fe = COL, OIL, GAS) trading off at a constant elasticity of
substitution. The CES utility function is:
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where the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy composites is
given by σC = 1/(1-ρC), the elasticity of substitution within the fossil fuel aggregate by σFE =
1/(1-ρFE), and θj are the value shares in non-fossil fuel consumption. The structure of final
demand is presented in Figure A.3.
Total income of the representative agent consists of factor income, revenues from
taxes levied on output, intermediate inputs, exports and imports, final demand as well as tax
revenues from CO2 taxes (TR) and a baseline exogenous capital flow representing the balance
of payment deficits B less expenses for exogenous total investment demand PI⋅I. The
government activity is financed through lump-sum levies. It does not enter the utility function
and is hence exogenous in the model. The budget constraint is then given by:
r r vr rr r r r vr r r r
v
PC C PL L PK K PR R TR B PI I⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + − ⋅∑      [23]
with C the aggregate household consumption in region r and PC its associated price.
Figure A.3: Structure of household demand
A.3 Foreign Trade
All commodities are traded in world markets. Crude oil and coal are imported and exported as
a homogeneous product, reflecting empirical evidence that these fossil fuel markets are rather
integrated due to cheap shipping possibilities. All other goods are characterized by product
differentiation. There is imperfect transformability (between exports and domestic sales of
domestic output) and imperfect substitutability (between imports and domestically sold
domestic output). Bilateral trade flows are subject to export taxes, tariffs and transportation
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costs and calibrated to the base year 1995. There is an imposed balance of payment constraint
to ensure trade balance, which is warranted through flexible exchange rates, incorporating the
benchmark trade deficit or surplus for each region.
On the output side, two types of differentiated goods are produced as joint products for
sale in the domestic markets and the export markets, respectively. The allocation of output
between domestic sales D and international sales X is characterized by a constant elasticity of
transformation (CET) function. Hence, firms maximize profits subject to the constraint:
1/
ir ir ir irir irY D X
ηη ηφ α β = +                                   [24]
with σ tr = 1/(1 + η) the transformation elasticity.
Regarding imports, the standard Armington convention is adopted in the sense that
imported and domestically produced goods of the same kind are treated as incomplete
substitutes (i. e. wine from France is different from Italian wine). The aggregate amount of
each (Armington) good A is divided among imports and domestic production:
1/ DD D
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ρ ρφ α β = +                            [25]
In this expression σ D = 1/(1-ρ D) is the Armington elasticity between domestic and
imported varieties. Imports M are allocated among import regions s according to a CES
function:
1/ M
M
ir ir ir isr
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                               [26]
with X the amount of exports from region s to region r and σ M = 1/(1-ρ M) the
Armington elasticity among imported varieties. Intermediate as well as final demands are,
hence, (nested CES) Armington composites of domestic and imported varieties.
The assumption of product differentiation permit the model to match bilateral trade
with cross-hauling of trade and avoids unrealistically strong specialization effects in response
to exogenous changes in trade (tax) policy. On the other hand, the results may then be
sensitive to the particular commodity and regional aggregation chosen in the model.
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A.4 Carbon emissions
Carbon emissions are associated with fossil fuel consumption in production, investment,
government and private demand. Carbon is treated as a Leontief (fixed coefficient) input into
production and consumption activities. Each unit of a fuel emits a known amount of carbon
where different fuels have different carbon intensities. The applied carbon coefficients are 25
MT carbon per EJ for coal, 14 MT carbon per EJ for gas and 20 MT carbon per EJ for refined
oil.
Carbon policies are introduced via an additional constraint that holds carbon emissions
to a specified limit. The solution of the model gives a shadow value on carbon associated with
this carbon constraint. This dual variable or shadow price can be interpreted as the price of
carbon permits in a carbon permit system or as the CO2 tax that would induce the carbon
constraint in the model. The shadow value of the carbon constraint equals the marginal cost of
reduction. It indicates the incremental cost of reducing carbon at the carbon constraint. The
total costs represent the resource cost or dead-weight loss to the economy of imposing carbon
constraints. Carbon emission constraints induce substitution of fossil fuels with less expensive
energy sources (fuel switching) or employment of less energy-intensive manufacturing and
production techniques (energy savings). The only means of abatement are hence inter-fuel and
fuel-/non-fuel substitution or the reduction of intermediate and final consumption.
Given an emission constraint producers as well as consumers must pay this price on
the emissions resulting from the production and consumption processes. Revenues coming
from the imposition of the carbon constraint are given to the representative agent. The total
cost of Armington inputs in production and consumption that reflects the CES production
technology in [25] but takes CO2 emission restrictions into account is:
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with ai the carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i and τ the shadow price of CO2
in region r associated with the carbon emission restriction:
2r ir i
i
CO A a= ⋅∑                                                  [28]
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where 2rCO  is the endowment of carbon emission rights in region r.
A.5 Zero Profit and Market Clearance Conditions
The equilibrium conditions in the model are zero profit and market clearance
conditions. Zero profit conditions as derived in [2] require that no producer earns an “excess”
profit in equilibrium. The value of inputs per unit activity must be equal to the value of
outputs. The zero profit conditions for production, using the variable input coefficient derived
above, is:
K L M
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PK a Y PL a Y PA a Y PY Y⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅∑ .             [29]
The market clearance conditions state that market demand equals market supply for all
inputs and outputs. Market clearance conditions have to hold in equilibrium. Domestic
markets clear, equating aggregate domestic output plus imports, i.e. total Armington good
supply, to aggregate demand, which consists of intermediate demand, final demand,
investment and government demand:
Y
jr r
ir jr r
ir irj
e
A Y C
PA PA
π∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂∑                                  [30]
with PA the price of the Armington composite. πirZ is the per unit zero profit function
with Z the name assigned to the associated production activity. The derivation of πirZ , with
respect to input and output prices, yields the compensated demand and supply coefficients,
e.g. ∂ πjrY / ∂ PAir = aijrA the intermediate demand for Armington good i in sector j of region r
per unit of output Y. Output for the domestic market equals total domestic demand:
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with PD the domestic commodity price. Export supply equals import demand across
all trading partners:
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with PX the export price. Aggregate import supply equals total import demand:
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where PM is the import price.
Primary factor endowment equals primary factor demand:
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An equilibrium is characterized by a set of prices in the different goods and factor
markets such that the zero profit and market clearance conditions stated above hold.
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A.6 Overview of Elasticities
Table A.1 provides a summary of elasticity values adopted for the core simulations.
Table A.1: Default values of key substitution and supply elasticities
________________________________________________________
Description Value
_________________________________________________________
Substitution elasticities in non-fossil fuel production
σ KLE Energy vs. value added 0.8
σ KL Capital vs. labor 1.0
σ E Electricity vs. primary energy inputs 0.3
σ COL Coal vs. gas-oil 0.5
Substitution elasticities in final demand
σ C Fossil fuels vs. non-fossil fuels 0.8
σ FE Fossil fuels vs. fossil fuels 0.3
Elasticities in international trade (Armington)
σ D Substitution elasticity between imports vs. 4.0
        domestic inputs
σ M Substitution elasticity between imports vs. 8.0
      imports
σ tr Transformation elasticity domestic vs. export 2.0
Exogenous supply elasticities of fossil fuels ε
Crude oil 1.0
Coal 0.5
Natural gas 1.0
_________________________________________________________
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Appendix B: Regional and Sectoral Aggregation
The model is calibrated to the energy-economy data set GTAP-EG which combines economic
data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database with energy flows and energy
prices form OECD International Energy Agency (IEA) statistics (Rutherford and Paltsev
2000). The GTAP-EG data set encompasses 45 regions and 22 goods/sectors (5 of which are
energy goods/sectors) as listed in Tables B.1 and B.2. Regions and sectors of the original
GTAP-EG data set are aggregated according to Tables B.3 and B.4 to yield the model’s
regions and sectors.
Table B.1: Regions in GTAP-EG
ARG Argentina MYS Malaysia
AUS Australia NZL New Zealand
BRA Brazil PHL Philippines
CAM Central America and Caribbean RAP Rest of Andean Pact
CAN Canada RAS Rest of South Asia
CEA Central European Associates REU Rest of EU
CHL Chile RME Rest of Middle East
CHN China RNF Rest of North Africa
COL Columbia ROW Rest of World
DEU Germany RSA Rest of South Africa
DNK Denmark RSM Rest of South America
EFT European Free Trade Area RSS Rest of South-Saharan Africa
FIN Finland SAF South Africa
FSU Former Soviet Union SGP Singapore
GBR United Kingdom SWE Sweden
HKG Hong Kong THA Thailand
IDN Indonesia TUR Turkey
IND India TWN Taiwan
JPN Japan URY Uruguay
KOR Republic of Korea USA United States of America
LKA Sri Lanka VEN Venezuela
MAR Morocco VNM Vietnam
MEX Mexico
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Table B.2: Goods/Sectors in GTAP-EG
AGR Agricultural products NFM Non-ferrous metals
CNS Construction NMM Non-metallic minerals
COL Coal OIL Refined oil products
CRP Chemical industry OME Other machinery
CRU Crude oil OMF Other manufacturing
DWE Dwellings OMN Mining
ELE Electricity and heat PPP Paper-pulp-print
FPR Food products SER Commercial and public services
GAS Natural gas works T_T Trade margins
I_S Iron and steel industry TRN Transport equipment
LUM Wood and wood-products TWL Textiles-wearing apparel-leather
Table B.3: Mapping from GTAP-EG regions to model regions as of Table 1
Model Regions GTAP-EG Regions
Annex B
USA United States USA
EUR OECD Europe (incl. EFTA) DEU, DNK, EFT, FIN, GBR, REU, SWE
JPN Japan JPN
CAN Canada CAN
AUN Australia, New Zealand AUS, NZL
CEA Central and Eastern Europe CEA
FSU Former Soviet Union FSU
Non-Annex B
CHN China CHN, HKG
IND India IND
ASI Asia KOR, LKA, MYS, PHL, RAS, SGP, THA, TWN,
VNM
MPC Mexico and OPEC IDN, MEX, RME, RNF, VEN
ROW Rest of world MAR, ROW, RSA, RSS, SAF, TUR
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Table B.4: Mapping from GTAP-EG sectors to model sectors as of Table 1
Model Sectors GTAP-EG Sectors
Energy
COL Coal COL
CRU Crude oil CRU
GAS Natural gas GAS
OIL Refined oil products OIL
ELE Electricity ELE
Non-Energy
EIS Energy-intensive sectors CRP, I_S, NFM, NMM, PPP, TRN
ROI Rest of industry AGR, CNS, DWE, FPR, LUM, OME, OMF, OMN,
SER, T_T, TWL
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Appendix C: GHG Emission Reduction Targets for Annex-B countries
Labela Original Kyoto Targets (OLD)b
(% of 1990 base year GHG emissions)
Revised Targets (NEW)c
(% of 1990 base year GHG emissions)
Australia AUN 108 110.7
Austria      EUR 87 92.9
Belgium      EUR 92.5 93.8
Bulgaria CEA 92 95.2
Canada      CAN 94 107.9
Croatia      CEA 95 95
Czech Republic CEA 92 94.1
Denmark EUR 79 81.1
Estonia FSU 92 94.7
Finland      EUR 100 107.8
France      EUR 100 103.9
Germany EUR 79 80.7
Greece      EUR 125 133.1
Hungary      CEA 94 97.8
Iceland      EUR 110 118
Ireland      EUR 113 116.2
Italy      EUR 93.5 95.3
Japan      JPN 94 99.2
Latvia      FSU 92 98
Liechtenstein EUR 92 107.9
Lithuania EUR 92 96.5
Luxemburg  EUR 72 79.6
Monaco      EUR 92 93
Netherlands EUR 94 95.2
New Zealand AUN 100 107
Norway      EUR 101 105.3
Poland      CEA 94 96.5
Portugal EUR 127 130.7
Romania CEA 92 96.2
Russian Federation FSU 100 105.7
Slovakia CEA 92 96.3
Slovenia CEA 92 100.4
Spain      EUR 115 118.9
Sweden      EUR 104 109.5
Switzerland EUR 92 96.6
Ukraine      FSU 100 102.4
United Kingdom EUR 87.5 88.8
United States USA 93 96.8
a
 Label of aggregate model region which includes the respective Annex B country
b
 UNFCCC (1997)
c
 Estimates by the European Commission accounting for sink credits based on UNFCCC (2001)
